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A Prescription for Halting Deflation

February 21, 2013
By null

Yale Professor Urges Bolder Actions from the BOJ

Koichi Hamada, the Tuntex Professor Emeritus of Economics at Yale University and the mastermind behind Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s policy for economic revitalization—dubbed “Abenomics”—visited the Tokyo Foundation recently to share his thoughts with research fellows.

Hamada has been at the center of Japanese media attention for strongly endorsing Abe’s antideflation strategy. The professor’s remarks were widely quoted by the Liberal Democratic Party leader during the campaign for the December 16, 2012, House of Representatives election, which the LDP won by a landslide.

Hamada’s remarks significantly boosted the LDP’s standing among the public, many of whom are struggling to make ends meet. He advocates a bold quantitative easing policy to halt deflation and reverse the steep appreciation of the yen. Following the election victory, Hamada was appointed by the prime minister to serve as a special advisor to the cabinet.

* * *

Professor Hamada was a key Sylff steering committee member when the Sylff program was established at Yale in 1989, playing an instrumental role in building the program at the university during the crucial early period.

Professor Hamada was a key Sylff steering committee member when the Sylff program was established at Yale in 1989, playing an instrumental role in building the program at the university during the crucial early period.

Joined by Tokyo Foundation Senior Fellows Shigeki Morinobu and Yutaka Harada—experts on the economy and fiscal policy—and other Foundation research fellows at an informal Tokyo Foundation meeting on December 14, Koichi Hamada asserted it was high time for the Bank of Japan to overturn its cautious monetary policy. “Real or structural problems in the Japanese economy, like higher oil prices that have little to do with the currency system, can’t be addressed with monetary policy,” Hamada noted. “However, since deflation and the yen’s steep appreciation are issues related to the domestic and foreign value of money, they should be dealt with policies that directly address currency values.”

Hamada believes, though, that Japan’s monetary authorities have been trying to treat the symptoms with the wrong medicine for the past 15 years. “It’s like trying to cure a stomach ailment with drugs for a heart condition.”

The Bank of Japan contends that its zero-interest-rate policy already furnishes enough funds to the market and that any additional quantitative easing will not lead to increased lending. “All you have to do is look at the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities in the United States to realize that such arguments don’t hold water,” Hamada contended. “In Japan, the BOJ can easily purchase CPs, EFTs, REITs, and foreign currency denominated bonds.”

Just as expectations of deflation can in itself have a negative impact on the national psyche, “the belief that deflation is going to be overcome will have a positive effect,” he added. Indeed, the yen has depreciated by more than 10% since November, hitting a two-and-a-half-year low of around 91 per dollar in late January.

“Monetary policy is something that must be applied when the market needs it most,” Hamada emphasized. “It’s common knowledge in economics that monetary policy is more effective than fiscal policy under flexible rates. A bill was passed last year to raise Japan’s consumption tax to 8% by April 2014 and to 10% by October 2015. “Raising taxes first and then relaxing monetary policy is precisely what you shouldn’t do,” Hamada warned. “You need a recovery from deflation first, and then you can use a tax hike to control it, if necessary. And the consumption tax should be the last thing you raise. A much better idea would be an environment tax,” he said, which could encourage innovations in eco-friendly technologies.

 

Is the Yen Really Too Strong?

Shigeki Morinobu, left, and Koichi Hamada.

Shigeki Morinobu, left, and Koichi Hamada.

While admitting that deflation can be mitigated with monetary tools, Tokyo Foundation Senior Fellow and Chuo University Law School Professor Shigeki Morinobu cautioned that real-world trends must also be taken into consideration, such as the end of the Cold War that opened the floodgates to cheaper labor in Eastern Europe and demographic changes toward an aging society in Japan. “Inflation targeting can be effective,” he said, “but there remains the question of whether it can be stopped once the target is reached, say, at around 2 percent.” He also pointed to the negative consequences of having to make higher interest payments for one’s debt once inflation kicks in.

Morinobu also questioned the common assumption that the yen is too strong against the dollar. “In terms of purchasing power, comparing the prices of fast food in Japan and the United States, for instance,” he said, “I don’t think 80 yen is intolerably high. In fact, companies claiming the yen is too strong might simply be trying to cover up for the shortcomings in their own projections.”

Senior Fellow and Waseda University Professor Yutaka Harada took issue with this view, pointing out that just before the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, the yen was trading at around 120 yen per dollar. “When it steadily climbed to around 80 yen,” Harada said, “many Japanese businesses were forced to lay workers off or halt production of items that no longer paid at that exchange rate. Curtailing production,” he emphasized, “means fewer jobs.” Many companies have been able to survive as a result of these adjustments, but the ranks of the unemployed have swelled, and promising R&D projects have been abandoned. “Many of these technologies were picked up by companies in South Korea and elsewhere,” Harada noted, further compounding the woes of Japanese manufacturers.

Yutaka Harada, right, and Koichi Hamada.

Yutaka Harada, right, and Koichi Hamada.

The general lowering of income levels from higher unemployment and sluggish corporate profits, Harada commented, has been affecting demand in the nonexport sectors of the economy as well, exacerbating deflation. “There’s no denying that the exchange rate has presented a serious challenge to many Japanese companies,” Harada added.

Because the yen’s value is the rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, it is bound to rise if the United States expands the amount of money in the economy through quantitative easing while Japan does nothing. “The Fed doubled the money supply with QE1 and tripled it with QE2,” Harada said, as a means of overcoming the financial crisis. The money supply in Japan, which was not as severely affected by the crisis, has expanded by only around 30%. “That’s not nearly enough,” Harada asserted. “If Japan had at least doubled its money supply, the yen wouldn’t have shot up as high, and jobs wouldn’t have been lost.”

 

Working at a Disadvantage

Economists have pointed to the fact that while Japan’s per capita gross domestic product is nearly identical with that of South Korea in purchasing power terms, it is twice the South Korean figure when calculated using exchange rates, suggesting that the yen is disproportionately strong against the won.

“The Korean won depreciated by 30 percent against the dollar while the yen appreciated by 30 percent,” Harada said, “so there’s obviously going to be a big gap in the values of the two currencies.”

South Korea has been known to intervene directly in the currency market to adjust the exchange rate, “But the BOJ can do the same if it wanted to,” asserted Hamada. “It’s been overly timid, thinking that if it aimed for the green it would overshoot it, so it’s been using a putter to get itself out of a bunker for the past fifteen years. Many excellent studies have shown the extent to which Japanese companies have been placed at a disadvantage by this policy,” the Yale professor said, “but such studies have categorically been ignored by the central bank and the major media in Japan.”

The issue of Japan’s huge public debt cannot be overlooked, however, and the Abe administration has announced a fiscal stimulus package that is likely to exacerbate that debt. “Under the circumstances, there’s really no choice but to opt for reflation and somehow get the economy to a state close to full employment,” Hamada said. “Only then can we gauge how bad Japan’s fiscal condition really is. Any hike in the consumption can wait until then.”

Morinobu, though, pointed to the potential risks of higher interest rates on the real economy. “Higher interest will mean that the value of government bonds held by Japanese financial institutions will depreciate,” he claimed. “A 1 percent rise in interest rates will mean a decline of 10 trillion yen in the book value of these bonds. Such a drop will surely affect the capital adequacy ratio, and could lead to a credit squeeze.”

Harada offered the reminder that this has been the argument given by the Bank of Japan for not adopting a quantitative easing policy. “Bonds aren’t the only assets financial institutions own,” Harada said. “They also have loans, equities, and real estate. The bigger banks also have overseas assets, so a cheaper yen will boost those values. If quantitative easing can produce a lower yen, higher nominal GDP, more jobs, and increased tax revenues, there’s no good reason not to take this step.”

“The points we discussed today have been pondered at great length by economists over the past 250 years,” Hamada said in closing, “but our arguments have often gone unheard, even by central bankers. So in that sense, the attention given me by Mr. Shinzo Abe has been a source of great joy for me. At the same time,” he said, “I’m humbled by the fact that it takes politicians to get our message across to the media and the general public.”

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Why Regulate Hedge Funds? : Comments on the Brazilian Experience

August 20, 2012
By 19674

In June 2007, two hedge funds linked to Bear Stearns, a major American investment bank, announced losses of US$16 billion, forcing the bank to inject that amount to prevent the collapse of both funds. These funds operated with a high degree of leverage, based on derivatives financed with funds borrowed from large banks, guaranteed with securities backed by mortgages and other debts: the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). The funds together accounted for approximately US$18 billion in bonds (of which US$16.2 billion had been purchased with borrowed funds), which led Bear Stearns Asset Management to play a prominent role in the CDO market.

The losses represented the first signs of the serious financial crisis that would reach its peak the following year, in 2008, when Bear Stearns itself was bought by JP Morgan Chase in a deal for only US$236 million, aimed at avoiding bankruptcy.

Despite its seriousness, this was not the first time that the failure of a hedge fund triggered panic on international financial markets and weakened them. Ten years earlier, in 1998, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) forced the Fed, along with 14 financial institutions, to orchestrate a recapitalization of US$0.6 billion. Like Bear Stearns, LTCM had borrowed large amounts from the banking sector, allowing it to take bets that exceeded the notional value of US$1.5 trillion, while shareholders capital was no more than US$4.8 billion. This fund was, arguably, the most active user of interest rate swaps in the world, with contracts that totaled US$750 billion. The magnitude of the two events and the similarity of strategies used to obtain high returns—high degree of leverage and loans from banks—have raised questions about the effectiveness of regulatory initiatives to avoid the recurrence of systemic crisis.

Debate on Regulation

Traditionally, supporters of “laissez faire” argue that hedge funds increase the efficiency and liquidity of the financial system, either by spreading risk among a large number of investors or by improving the pricing of the traded assets, thus removing any space for more restrictive regulations. Not coincidentally, in the last 10 years, mainly in the United States and Europe, the notion that financial regulatory institutions should interfere minimally and only in situations involving the general public has preponderated. Along this line, the hedge funds, as private investment structures targeting high-income investors—and treated in a different way from regular investors—were placed outside the direct jurisdiction of regulators.

Following this line of thinking, regulatory efforts in the period focused on improving the ability of banks and other financial institutions to monitor and manage risks by individually managing exposure to these funds. The promotion of transparency about the risks assumed by those investment companies would be sufficient, it was argued, to enforce an adequate market discipline, with no need for a more direct regulation.

The predominance of this view has hindered the adoption of a more restrictive regulatory framework, especially with regard to the systemic aspects of these funds in financial markets. Even in the context of the last global crisis, the belief that hedge funds played a limited role in the genesis of the systemic turmoil has prevailed, in spite of the substantial losses they have suffered.

In this scenario, hedge funds have fed paradoxes with serious implications for the dynamics of the international financial system. First, they present themselves as managers of large private fortunes, mainly for large institutional investors; however, they usually take loans with the formal banking system, and thus they naturally transfer the risk of their positions to the entire credit system, that is, they transform the operations of private funds into operations throughout the investing public. Second, they claim to be able to deliver high absolute returns, in any condition, exploiting price anomalies in the market; however, they often suffer significant losses in situations of turbulence, as seen in the last global crisis. Third, while they remain largely outside the scope of regulations, they are undoubtedly channels of transmission of systemic risk. Fourth, despite the large number of these agents and the diversity in their investment strategies and objectives, they present a noticeable similarity in their risk exposures and the securities they trade, which tends to cancel any eventually positive effect of a possible heterogeneity of these agents.

The recent, post-crisis initiatives on the regulation of hedge funds, both in United States and Europe, have exhibited superficial and still timid proposals to effectively counter the contradictions listed above. On the other hand, unlike most countries that are still discussing and trying to adopt their laws, in Brazil it has already become a reality. Interestingly, most of the claims for stricter rules on the behavior of hedge funds are particularly familiar to the Brazilian financial markets, and Brazil may be able to make a significant contributions to the design of a more effective regulatory framework at the international level.

The Example of the Brazilian Experience

Traditionally, the Brazilian capital market has been marked by the presence of restrictive regulatory and supervisory structures. Particularly in the segment of investment funds, while the offshore vehicles enjoy wide freedom in conducting its operations, onshore funds must conform to strict standards of regulation and supervision. These standards, although targets of criticism by those who advocate a more flexible market, recently have received worldwide attention because of the low vulnerability demonstrated by domestic financial institutions during the unfolding of the international financial crisis, initiated in the subprime mortgage market in the United States.

Among the major domestic requirements, all investment funds based in Brazil must be registered with the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM, or the Securities Commission) that acts as the primary regulator and supervisor of funds and investment firms in the country. In accordance with CVM instructions, all funds, including hedge funds, must provide daily liquidity reports and disclose, also daily, the value of their quotas and assets to the general public. Moreover, managers must monthly deliver to CVM statements with the composition and diversification of the portfolio, as well as a summary trial balance of their funds. Additionally, every year they have to send to CVM a consolidated balance sheet approved by an independent auditor. At the same time, the Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiros e de Capitais (ANBIMA, or the Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Markets Entities), which pools the institutions that manage funds in Brazil, also plays an important self-policing role.

In addition to these requirements that provide more transparency to the public, an important restriction applied to the funds in Brazil is that these entities are prohibited from contracting and receiving loans from financial institutions. This limitation establishes an important difference between domestic and offshore funds, since it reduces the possibility of highly leveraged funds being supported by third parties and eliminates a disturbing channel of exposure of the formal banking system to hedge funds, which proved to be particularly disruptive to the international financial market in the last crisis.

On this point, it is important to note that Brazilian authorities do not officially consider hedge funds to be a different family of investment funds and usually subject them to the same regulatory rules that are applied to other funds. Another specificity of the Brazilian financial sector involves the over-the-counter market, in which all financial derivative instruments and securities traded are recorded with the Central de Custódia e de Liquidação Financeira de Títulos (CETIP, or the Central Securities Depository), an agency supervised by the Central Bank of Brazil and whose activities are regulated by CVM. Thus, all securities exchanged between private investors outside the regulated market (São Paulo Stock Exchange) are subject anyway to observation by national regulatory authorities. Again, in the context of both the international financial crisis and the collapse of LTCM in the United States, the absence of such information was particularly harmful in assessing the real extent of risk exposure between different financial institutions.

All these restrictions have been relatively successful in preventing and avoiding the propagation of systemic risk within the domestic financial market, although they are not fully able to prevent the contagion of crisis in the unregulated global markets. Amid the recent turmoil, the defense of more direct, coordinated, and continuous supervision of financial institutions in different countries has gained importance in international forums, making it increasingly more urgent. In this scenario, the Brazilian experience on the regulation of the investment fund industry can be a relevant reference in guiding these discussions at the international level.

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which she is or has been affiliated.

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Climate Change Response at a Crossroads

July 14, 2008
By null

CER-based trading of emissions rights has long-term implications for global political and economic power distribution and raises ethical questions about ownership of the right to use the atmosphere.

Globally as well as nationally, we are all at a crossroads. From Rio to Bali, we made efforts to build alternative institutional arrangements for international cooperation to address the problem of climate change. Over these years several positive steps have emerged, but real-world action is still far from the desired level (IPCC 2007, Stern 2007). There has been a marked jump in media coverage on climate change since 2007, but there is a need for further action. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) suggests differentiated responsibilities in mitigation due to differences in levels of fossil-fuel-based economic activity.

In the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, countries were grouped into Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Annex I are the OECD countries with high emissions, which were asked to meet reduction targets. Developing nations with lower fossil fuel consumption were grouped as non-Annex I countries and exempted from meeting targets. This arrangement recognized the reality that GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for more than 100 years; Annex I countries, which have been using fossil fuels since the Industrial Revolution, have largely been responsible for the stockpiling of GHGs in the atmosphere.

Though the Kyoto arrangement seemed logical, it was not ratified by such large emitters as the United States and Australia. And the free-riding attitude of the big emitters failed to induce cooperative solutions to the problem. To prompt action, there must be promises of a reward for the actions taken.

 

Reassessment of the CDM

The Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol is probably the only platform to coordinate the actions of both developed and developing countries toward a common cause by accommodating differentiated responsibilities and the need for incentives. Under this mechanism, an Annex I country is allowed to locate mitigation projects or buy emission reduction credits from developing countries to achieve its Kyoto emission reduction target. Developing countries, meanwhile, benefit from investment and technology transfer, helping their economies to grow on a low carbon pathway - a characteristics of sustainable development. A reassessment of this mechanism makes good sense, as the Kyoto negotiated period will be reviewed from 2009 with a view beyond 2012.

The CDM requires that greenhouse gas reductions from mitigation projects be calculated using a counterfactual baseline that approximates emissions levels without the project. Estimating GHG reductions is a multiple-step process (Sathaye et al. 2003), including (1) determination of additionality or eligibility of a project, (2) construction of a baseline approximating emissions levels that would have occurred without the project, (3) adjustment of the baseline to account for free riders, (4) calculation of project emissions, (5) adjustment of these calculations for potential leakage, and finally, (6) estimation of GHG reductions relative to the baseline.

Additionally, the estimated baseline may be subject to adjustment periodically to reflect changes in business-as-usual conditions. In order to receive credits for reducing GHG emissions within a given carbon trading scheme, a project may be subjected to additionality or eligibility tests (step 1) before being accepted as a qualified project. These tests are designed to ensure that a proposed project will result in real emission reductions.

 

Trading of CERs

This reassessment of the CDM will not discuss in detail the actual mechanism of certified emissions reductions or challenge its concept. Here, the objective is to highlight two issues associated with CERs that are not well understood, discussed, or researched. When CERs are introduced to an existing socio-political-economic landscape, they represent a completely new "good." It follows from the basic concept that if emissions are "bad" and impose costs on the society, then emission reductions are good and produce benefits. The production of such "good" primary products as power, steel, cement also leads to the generation of undesired emissions.

Suppose a 6 MW power generation project in India proposes to use rice husks as a new fuel by taking advantage of new technology. The goal of the project would be to replace coal, a fuel with high carbon content. Suppose, this project can reduce 40,000 tons of CO2 annually compared to a coal-fired plant. The project would then be eligible for 40,000 CERs while producing 6 MW of power. Like power, CERs can be exchanged and traded on the market. However, given the location of the project in developing countries with no Kyoto-related constraints, the 40,000 CERs generated by the project can now be sold to Annex I investors (although this is not automatic and requires a lengthy process, as mentioned above).

Under the Kyoto regime, Annex I countries with binding reduction targets may require such CERs to achieve their goals. Thus the Annex I countries represent the demand side of the CER market and non-Annex I countries the suppliers. The price of CERs will be determined by the relative market supply and demand. Given the voluntary nature of participation under the Kyoto regime, at present the size of the market is small. With the nonparticipation of large emitters, moreover, the demand is extremely small, keeping the price of CERs at very low levels. As of March 2008 total CERs issued globally were 121,122,134 metric tons (CO2 equivalent) and the price varied from 7 euros to 22 euros per metric ton. This is not to argue how the price situation can be improved but rather to show the implications of owning CERs.

 

Ownership of Global Natural Capital

CERs may be owned by any party. A unique characteristic of CERs is that their ownership effectively provides ownership over global natural capital, that is, the right to use the atmosphere. In simple terms, a new capital good is being introduced, ownership of which will result in global market power in the near future, not unlike knowledge capital and physical capital. Creation of such rights or ownership has both long-term implications for global political and economic power distribution and crucial ethical implications. Unless regulated within a target emission level, the creation of CERs will distort climate stabilization, market power and world order.

Non-Annex I countries like India and China that are market leaders with large supplies of CERs and no binding mitigation target under the Kyoto Protocol have little incentive to hold onto their CERs and may wind up squandering ownership over natural capital now and forever. There may even come a time when they will have to buy back those same CERs at a higher price at a later date.

No study exists to show whether countries lose or gain as late entrants in the market. But it can be predicted that they will forfeit an early mover's advantage despite their high potential. In the longer run this is going to be an issue of ownership of natural capital and global commons. Under the circumstances it makes good sense for non-Annex I countries to take up binding emission targets both from an efficiency and equity point of view.

 

Ethical Issues

But deeper issues must also be discussed. One is the ethical question of managing a global common property through inappropriately defined private ownership. Who will own the rights to a global common good? Should it be individual investors, banks, financial institutions, governments, or all future generations of humans on Earth? Ownership by one group, by definition, excludes that by others for the same resource. So under current CDM arrangements, the sellers of CERs are by implication selling off their rights to use a global common property without any institutional arrangement with symmetric information on defined ownership.

High transaction costs, limited market size due to the absence of a cap for non-Annex I countries, large-scale uncertainty on ownership type, lifetime of the market, and what happens beyond Kyoto are all inviting attention to reassess the CDM and CER market. The current state of affairs can be considered a period of learning and experimentation. Asymmetry in information and the ethical issue of providing a "global good" for private trading is bound to generate global conflict sooner or later unless the CDM is crafted properly. The learning process combined with new knowledge can pave the way toward global target setting and a binding target for all whereby each player can choose its role on a level paying ground. This will ensure efficiency as well as equity, but ethical questions will still remain unresolved. Neither does it solve the problem of free riding in the Kyoto regime. There is thus still a long way to go in finding a nondistorting solution.

 

Concluding Remarks

It is time to understand that GHG emissions reduction is an economic activity. It makes good business sense to invest in the low-carbon development pathway. However, without a limit to emissions generation, the CDM will limit participation and distort the situation. A new regime is needed to replace the emphasis on voluntary action. Binding targets needs to be taken up by each emitter, however small or large, from the viewpoints of efficiency and equity.

Targets may be decided by nation-states and negotiated within the global goal of stabilizing emission levels. Under any circumstances, there is a need to coordinate national priorities and goals with those of the international community. Although nation-states are free to decide their own national policies, it can be predicted that those who benefit will be those who can best coordinate national and global goals.

The views presented in this article are of the author and in no way represent those of her country of origin, India, or the IPCC.

References

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). "Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change." Working Group III contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press.

Sathaye, J., Scott Murtishaw, Lynn Price, Maurice Lefranc, Joyashree Roy, Herald Winkler, and Randall Spalding-Fecher (2003). "Multiproject Baselines for Evaluation of Electric Power Projects," Energy Policy, Vol. 32/11 pp 1303-17.

Stern N. (2007). "The Economics of Climate Change." The Stern Review. London: Cambridge University Press.


 

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