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Climate Change Response at a Crossroads

July 14, 2008
By null

CER-based trading of emissions rights has long-term implications for global political and economic power distribution and raises ethical questions about ownership of the right to use the atmosphere.

Globally as well as nationally, we are all at a crossroads. From Rio to Bali, we made efforts to build alternative institutional arrangements for international cooperation to address the problem of climate change. Over these years several positive steps have emerged, but real-world action is still far from the desired level (IPCC 2007, Stern 2007). There has been a marked jump in media coverage on climate change since 2007, but there is a need for further action. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) suggests differentiated responsibilities in mitigation due to differences in levels of fossil-fuel-based economic activity.

In the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, countries were grouped into Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Annex I are the OECD countries with high emissions, which were asked to meet reduction targets. Developing nations with lower fossil fuel consumption were grouped as non-Annex I countries and exempted from meeting targets. This arrangement recognized the reality that GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for more than 100 years; Annex I countries, which have been using fossil fuels since the Industrial Revolution, have largely been responsible for the stockpiling of GHGs in the atmosphere.

Though the Kyoto arrangement seemed logical, it was not ratified by such large emitters as the United States and Australia. And the free-riding attitude of the big emitters failed to induce cooperative solutions to the problem. To prompt action, there must be promises of a reward for the actions taken.

Reassessment of the CDM

The Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol is probably the only platform to coordinate the actions of both developed and developing countries toward a common cause by accommodating differentiated responsibilities and the need for incentives. Under this mechanism, an Annex I country is allowed to locate mitigation projects or buy emission reduction credits from developing countries to achieve its Kyoto emission reduction target. Developing countries, meanwhile, benefit from investment and technology transfer, helping their economies to grow on a low carbon pathway - a characteristics of sustainable development. A reassessment of this mechanism makes good sense, as the Kyoto negotiated period will be reviewed from 2009 with a view beyond 2012.

The CDM requires that greenhouse gas reductions from mitigation projects be calculated using a counterfactual baseline that approximates emissions levels without the project. Estimating GHG reductions is a multiple-step process (Sathaye et al. 2003), including (1) determination of additionality or eligibility of a project, (2) construction of a baseline approximating emissions levels that would have occurred without the project, (3) adjustment of the baseline to account for free riders, (4) calculation of project emissions, (5) adjustment of these calculations for potential leakage, and finally, (6) estimation of GHG reductions relative to the baseline.

Additionally, the estimated baseline may be subject to adjustment periodically to reflect changes in business-as-usual conditions. In order to receive credits for reducing GHG emissions within a given carbon trading scheme, a project may be subjected to additionality or eligibility tests (step 1) before being accepted as a qualified project. These tests are designed to ensure that a proposed project will result in real emission reductions.

Trading of CERs

This reassessment of the CDM will not discuss in detail the actual mechanism of certified emissions reductions or challenge its concept. Here, the objective is to highlight two issues associated with CERs that are not well understood, discussed, or researched. When CERs are introduced to an existing socio-political-economic landscape, they represent a completely new "good." It follows from the basic concept that if emissions are "bad" and impose costs on the society, then emission reductions are good and produce benefits. The production of such "good" primary products as power, steel, cement also leads to the generation of undesired emissions.

Suppose a 6 MW power generation project in India proposes to use rice husks as a new fuel by taking advantage of new technology. The goal of the project would be to replace coal, a fuel with high carbon content. Suppose, this project can reduce 40,000 tons of CO2 annually compared to a coal-fired plant. The project would then be eligible for 40,000 CERs while producing 6 MW of power. Like power, CERs can be exchanged and traded on the market. However, given the location of the project in developing countries with no Kyoto-related constraints, the 40,000 CERs generated by the project can now be sold to Annex I investors (although this is not automatic and requires a lengthy process, as mentioned above).

Under the Kyoto regime, Annex I countries with binding reduction targets may require such CERs to achieve their goals. Thus the Annex I countries represent the demand side of the CER market and non-Annex I countries the suppliers. The price of CERs will be determined by the relative market supply and demand. Given the voluntary nature of participation under the Kyoto regime, at present the size of the market is small. With the nonparticipation of large emitters, moreover, the demand is extremely small, keeping the price of CERs at very low levels. As of March 2008 total CERs issued globally were 121,122,134 metric tons (CO2 equivalent) and the price varied from 7 euros to 22 euros per metric ton. This is not to argue how the price situation can be improved but rather to show the implications of owning CERs.

Ownership of Global Natural Capital

CERs may be owned by any party. A unique characteristic of CERs is that their ownership effectively provides ownership over global natural capital, that is, the right to use the atmosphere. In simple terms, a new capital good is being introduced, ownership of which will result in global market power in the near future, not unlike knowledge capital and physical capital. Creation of such rights or ownership has both long-term implications for global political and economic power distribution and crucial ethical implications. Unless regulated within a target emission level, the creation of CERs will distort climate stabilization, market power and world order.

Non-Annex I countries like India and China that are market leaders with large supplies of CERs and no binding mitigation target under the Kyoto Protocol have little incentive to hold onto their CERs and may wind up squandering ownership over natural capital now and forever. There may even come a time when they will have to buy back those same CERs at a higher price at a later date.

No study exists to show whether countries lose or gain as late entrants in the market. But it can be predicted that they will forfeit an early mover's advantage despite their high potential. In the longer run this is going to be an issue of ownership of natural capital and global commons. Under the circumstances it makes good sense for non-Annex I countries to take up binding emission targets both from an efficiency and equity point of view.

Ethical Issues

But deeper issues must also be discussed. One is the ethical question of managing a global common property through inappropriately defined private ownership. Who will own the rights to a global common good? Should it be individual investors, banks, financial institutions, governments, or all future generations of humans on Earth? Ownership by one group, by definition, excludes that by others for the same resource. So under current CDM arrangements, the sellers of CERs are by implication selling off their rights to use a global common property without any institutional arrangement with symmetric information on defined ownership.

High transaction costs, limited market size due to the absence of a cap for non-Annex I countries, large-scale uncertainty on ownership type, lifetime of the market, and what happens beyond Kyoto are all inviting attention to reassess the CDM and CER market. The current state of affairs can be considered a period of learning and experimentation. Asymmetry in information and the ethical issue of providing a "global good" for private trading is bound to generate global conflict sooner or later unless the CDM is crafted properly. The learning process combined with new knowledge can pave the way toward global target setting and a binding target for all whereby each player can choose its role on a level paying ground. This will ensure efficiency as well as equity, but ethical questions will still remain unresolved. Neither does it solve the problem of free riding in the Kyoto regime. There is thus still a long way to go in finding a nondistorting solution.

Concluding Remarks

It is time to understand that GHG emissions reduction is an economic activity. It makes good business sense to invest in the low-carbon development pathway. However, without a limit to emissions generation, the CDM will limit participation and distort the situation. A new regime is needed to replace the emphasis on voluntary action. Binding targets needs to be taken up by each emitter, however small or large, from the viewpoints of efficiency and equity.

Targets may be decided by nation-states and negotiated within the global goal of stabilizing emission levels. Under any circumstances, there is a need to coordinate national priorities and goals with those of the international community. Although nation-states are free to decide their own national policies, it can be predicted that those who benefit will be those who can best coordinate national and global goals.

The views presented in this article are of the author and in no way represent those of her country of origin, India, or the IPCC.

References

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). "Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change." Working Group III contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press.

Sathaye, J., Scott Murtishaw, Lynn Price, Maurice Lefranc, Joyashree Roy, Herald Winkler, and Randall Spalding-Fecher (2003). "Multiproject Baselines for Evaluation of Electric Power Projects," Energy Policy, Vol. 32/11 pp 1303-17.

Stern N. (2007). "The Economics of Climate Change." The Stern Review. London: Cambridge University Press.

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Can Aid Change Burma?

July 14, 2008
By 21164

Susan Banki received a Sylff fellowship between 1999 and 2002 while attending the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She has written numerous articles on Burma. This article, written in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, was originally featured in the May 2008 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review (Vol. 171, No. 4) and has been posted here by courtesy of FEER.

Activists who promote political reform in Burma have, for years, debated the advisability of allowing international aid into the country. Many groups have argued that Burma's military junta selectively distributes all aid through government channels and hence only strengthens the authoritarian regime. But in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, which has killed as many as 140,000 and displaced as many as 2.5 million, there is a general consensus among even the most strident supporters of aid sanctions that Burma urgently needs international assistance.

It's a bitter irony, then, that when the country needs it the most, Burma's generals have been slow to allow humanitarian aid to enter. While intense pressure from the international community has improved the flow of aid somewhat, only a fraction of international assistance has yet entered the country, and Burma continues to block visas for humanitarian workers.

There is no question that Burma needs more aid. That is the first priority. But some ways of giving aid will be more effective than others, and some even have the potential to induce political transformation in Burma, as the 2004 tsunami served as a catalyst for reconciliation in the Indonesian province of Aceh.

While Aceh and Burma are dissimilar in many ways (foremost among them that the secessionist movement in Aceh was in the process of discussing a peace agreement when the tsunami hit, while the recent referendum in Burma excluded much of the opposition), if the international community can draw on some of the lessons learned in Aceh, it will increase the likelihood of political reform in Burma. Thus, here are some strategies for maximizing the effectiveness of aid immediately and encouraging the possibility of reconciliation in the intermediate term.

First, the international community must continue to push for more aid to enter the country. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's visit to Burma this week is an encouraging sign, and the fact that 10 U.N. helicopters were allowed to fly aid into the country, is hopefully a sign that the junta is loosening its grip. While reliable reports indicate that some aid is being sold on the black market in the capital, Rangoon, the need continues to be so great that whatever aid makes it into the country will improve the lives of some of Burma's terribly impoverished citizens.

Second, aid agencies should get their foot in the door as soon as possible, even if it means compromising the humanitarian principle of independence in the short term. Burma's military-security apparatus is only so large, and the hope is that as aid enters in mass quantities, it literally overwhelms the control of Burma's generals. Thus far, the junta has proved quite resistant to influence, but now that ASEAN has agreed to handle the influx of foreign aid, more agencies may find ways to enter Burma.

Third, and related, agencies should continue to push to place more humanitarian workers on the ground. Any attempt to airdrop aid without obtaining the regime's permission is a poor substitute for the entrance of humanitarian workers. Burma needs more foreign workers not because there aren't enough logisticians and disaster experts in-country at present, as some have claimed, but rather, because foreign workers represent the best possibility of opening up Burma to the outside world. This is precisely what the regime fears, and why it continues to insist that few foreign workers be permitted to enter. Humanitarian workers from India and China, both of which have recently been permitted, is a start, but agencies should continue to lobby for access for as many foreign workers as possible.

Fourth, journalists should continue their attempts to enter Burma so they can deliver firsthand reports and keep Burma in the news. Aceh only gained attention in the international media about 10 days after the 2004 tsunami, when between 300 to 500 journalists finally were able to file onsite reports. If Burma's generals believe that media reports will make the rest of the world more sympathetic to the tragedy, and more willing to help, then they may permit some journalists to enter.

Fifth, agencies should, whenever possible, find unofficial means to work with civil society groups and Buddhist monks to distribute aid. This suggestion will prove difficult since the regime has banned monks from assisting others, has instructed citizens not to seek shelter in monasteries, and insists that all aid go through government channels. But opportunities to bypass official channels will present themselves, particularly in light of the fact some Burmese officials ignored orders to remain in the capital and instead went AWOL in search of family members. Other Burmese officials are rumored to be greatly frustrated by commands from the top that they cease helping villagers in need. These examples represent a breakdown in the military's strict hierarchy and could be a lever for incremental change.

Sixth, agencies should make attempts to build pathways for future longer-term development aid. For example, the timely prevention of cholera would be best accomplished by effective water-sanitation systems, which aid workers should try to introduce as part of their relief provisions. A caveat, however: the Burmese generals are insisting that the disaster relief phase is over and that all aid should now be focused on rehabilitation and reconstruction. Its request for 11 billion dollars must not be separated from the current relief effort, but must instead be linked to it. Linking emergency relief with development aid has two possible positive consequences: first, it sets the stage for a more robust post-emergency phase in which recipients of aid are better off, and second, it will lengthen the "window of opportunity"—the post-disaster phase when the regime is at its most vulnerable and political transformation is most possible.

Finally, all parties to the ongoing conflict in Burma should encourage dialogue and communication among opposing parties in the name of rebuilding Burma. It has been argued that one of the key catalysts for peace in Aceh was the commitment to a ceasefire by the insurgent forces, a move that made the Indonesian military more willing to permit aid into the country. In Burma, a parallel concession by opposition parties would be to refrain from pointing fingers of blame at the junta.

Responses to natural disasters in the context of conflict can initiate phases of cooperation and reconciliation, as occurred in Aceh. Alternatively, and more commonly, disaster responses can entrench current power structures and foster further conflict. This latest tragedy in Burma, must, somehow, be turned into a possibility for political transformation, by using aid carefully and effectively. Through it, the international community can create the opening that the people of Burma deserve.

Ms. Banki is a research fellow at the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law at Griffith University in Australia. She has written numerous articles on Burmese refugees and migrants, political mobilization directed toward Burma, and aid to Burma.

This article was originally featured in the May 2008 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review (Vol. 171, No. 4) and has been posted here by courtesy of FEER.

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A War-Torn Land Finds a Road to Peace

July 14, 2008
By 20889

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has endured two wars in the last ten years. A peace treaty has been signed, however, and the first free election in more than 40 years has given the country hope.

Africa’s First World War

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has seen two wars in the last 10 years, dubbed “the first African world war.” The wars, which were essentially foreign yet fought on Congolese soil, saw military leaders choose violent solutions for seeking control, letting poverty and democratic governance fall by the wayside.

The wars also saw an emergence of international organized crime cells seeking to traffic arms and strategic minerals such as Colombo-tantalite ore, diamond, copper, cobalt, and gold. The cost of human life, as a direct or indirect result of the world war, has been scandalously high.

However, conflicts in central Africa still exist often as the result of poor governance, a characteristic of the condition of postcolonial African states. From the independence period, these states were supported by northern regimes that underestimated the consequences of corruption, human rights abuses, lack of the rule of law, and state and electoral fraud.

A quick look at the current state of Africa shows that the continent is in turmoil:

In the east: The conflict in the horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Eritrea has hardly come to an end. It is still going on through a third party in Somalia today.
In the north-east: The conflict in Darfur reminds us that Sudan has not yet put an end to its long-standing wars despite some remarkable progress made by the government of Khartoum and the rebel movement in southern Sudan. The extension of this conflict to Chad and the insecurity it brings about in the Central African Republic is a threat to the whole regional peace process.
In the south: The question of land ownership in Zimbabwe makes stability precarious in South Africa, which has similar issues. In Angola, the wounds of a long-lasting civil war will still require more time to be healed.
In the north-west: The conflict in Western Sahara, which has been forgotten by many countries, and the extremism in Algeria require a rapid solution, or peace will be threatened in this region.
In the west: The slow and painful peace building process in the Ivory Coast reminds us that the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia were not isolated cases.
Sporadic fighting between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria and the conflict in the Niger Delta region are a constant cause for concern.

Studies suggest that the main causes of conflicts in Africa are related to the following main points: poor governance, tension around natural resources, ethnic differences, and nationalism.

With regard to governance, studies suggest that the colonial heritage in Africa is one of the primary reasons for the endemic instability on the continent, while the partitioning of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century proved to have had some of the most damaging outcomes.

Post colonial adjustments followed by the Cold War caused flimsy governance structures, with the superpowers worrying more about their own interests rather than those of the African states themselves. Today, the former colonists have become “the international community.” This international community provided means and political support to its allies but considered such issues as corruption, human rights abuses, lack of a rule of law, and state and electoral fraud as trivial matters.

For example, in 1972, genocide against Hutu intellectuals in Burundi was intentionally ignored by the international community. Rwanda saw the Tutsi victims massacred in the name of the so-called social revolution (1959), which was also ignored. In the DRC, Mobutu was never prosecuted for being a dictator, kleptomaniac, or human rights abuser until the 1990s. It was only when Rwanda and Uganda fought in 2001 in Kisangani for control of the diamond trade that the United Nations Security Council took action on the issue.

In the 1990s this situation led to the explosion or breakdown of existing political alliances. The holders of dictatorial power found they could not control the opposition,, the revolts, or the internal rebel forces because the international community had stopped protecting and financially supporting them.

The DRC has been through two successive wars since 1996. The first one started in September 1996 and ended on May 17, 1998. The second broke out on August 2, 1998, and is still going on today, particularly in the eastern part of the country. It is one of the worst conflicts seen in the world since World War II. The 1996 war killed 200,000 people, and the 1998 war saw 3.5 million dead and 2.5 million displaced, among them more than 400,000 children. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reports that the percentage of malnourished people has increased from 35 percent in 1990-1992 to 64 percent in 1997-1999. This situation has made DRC one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2001, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 16 million Congolese people were under the minimum level of nourishment for survival.

The first war in the DRC involved foreign armies from more than nine countries, including Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and South Africa. The stated objective of this coalition was to overthrow the dictator Mobutu, but apart from this common goal, each country involved had its own agenda, such as changing the borders of the DRC as inherited from the colonial period.

As a meeting of different wars on Congolese soil, some political observers consider the conflicts in the DRC to have been the first African world war.

Roadmap to Peace

We contributed to this fragile peace-building process by investing in protecting human rights, civic education, and popular participation. We also helped realize the first free election in the DRC in more than 40 years. However, elections do not always mean democracy, and the way forward still remains a challenge. After 32 years of dictatorship and 10 years of war, my country is yet to be rebuilt.

In January 2008, a peace conference was held in Kivu in northern DRC. The conference had the objective of initiating peace, stability, and development and putting an end to the war in North and South Kivu province.

The conference requested that the Rwandan and Burundian refugees return to their respective countries, as well as calling for disarmament and the repatriation of foreign arms groups still on DRC territory. After three weeks of work, the armed groups and the government signed, in the presence of the international community, an act of engagement for peace, known as the Amani Program or Peace Program.

The DRC is now run by an elected government under a prime minister, Antoine Gizenga, elected and appointed by the presidential majority party. We have a parliament with 2 chambers, 11 provincial parliaments, and 11 provincial governments. All these institutions are under the constitutional control of an elected president.

Although there had been a rebel group after the elections, the Amani peace conference convinced this last rebellion to recognize the authority of the state founded on the elections.

Today, we should put much emphasis on the reconstruction. This means organizing a system of good governance where all significant social bodies are represented at the political, economic, and military levels, promoting capacity building in administration, and judicial services, and achieving a regime without political army that is devoted to the people and not to the leaders. We will also promote a regional approach to conflict resolutions, understanding the major causes of wars at both the national and sub-regional levels, combat poverty through common programs of development, transform war economies to integrated trade, and implement common measures of conflict prevention similar to the methods of the AU (African Union) and UN.

Outstanding Leadership

The Second Sylff (The Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund) Prize was recently awarded to Rigobert Minani-Bihuzo, 47, a leader in promoting human rights and civic education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in central Africa. Rigobert is the founder and representative of Groupe Jérémie, an nongovernmental organization actively engaged in these fields in the DRC and the African Great Lake region.

Overseeing the coordination of the first free election in the DRC in more than 40 years, he helped organize the Cadre de Concertation de la Société Civile pour l'Observation des Élections (CDCE), an association of 22 NGOs for election observation. Rigobert directed the activities of some 50,000 national observers and 125 international observers sent from the European Network for Central Africa (EurAc), a network of European NGOs. He has also been involved in various governmental efforts for cease-fires and reconciliation in war-stricken DRC.

Rigobert was invited to Japan for two weeks in January 2007 to receive the Sylff Prize and to establish contact with individuals and organizations—both governmental and non-governmental—for future collaboration.

About Sylff

Sylff (The Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund) is a fellowship program established in 1987 to support promising graduate students in the fields of the social sciences and humanities. This program tries to nurture leaders of tomorrow who are willing to address issues of global concern and effect changes by proactively tackling them. The Sylff program is a collaborative program by The Nippon Foundation and The Tokyo Foundation with the former donating the endowment of US$1 million each to each selected institution, and the latter being responsible for administering and promoting the network within and beyond the Sylff community. As of now, endowments have been established at 68 institutions in 44 countries, and over 10,000 graduate students have received the Sylff fellowship.

Rigobert received a Sylff fellowship in 1995–1997 for his DEA (diploma of advanced studies) in political science at the Institute of Political Education “Pedro Arrupe” in Italy.

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Kenya’s Post-Election Violence

July 14, 2008
By 19741

Have colonial ghosts come back to haunt Kenya? Taking a look at the recent violence that spread across what was one of the most politically stable countries in Africa, and asking why such a steady country faced such sudden tremulous times, a Kenyan anthropologist, engaged in human rights issues, gives us his perspective.

Kenya, one of the most politically stable countries in Africa, is found on the east horn of the African continent. The country gained its independence from the British in 1963 after years of armed struggle and diplomatic negotiations led by a generation of leaders who are still in active politics today. Diverse interests that have accumulated over time, especially in businesses, have continued to control the country’s politics, and when a motley crew of younger opposition politicians upstaged them in elections last year, the old leaders just dug in and refused to leave. Widespread violence followed. The government, for a time, continued to play truant and refused to enter into any meaningful form of power sharing agreement with the opposition, even amidst talks chaired by former United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan and backed by the international community, in particular the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This essay attempts to put this story into perspective.

Kenya’s Post-Election Violence

For the better part of the first two months of the year, Kenya’s political situation remained fluid, tense and unpredictable. The country was not holding, and a bloodbath loomed after weeks of ethnic violence precipitated by a suspected electoral fraud that returned President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity to power. As wide sections of the population tottered from the consequences of internal strife, a nebulous search for peace began in Nairobi: the National Dialogue and Mediation forum, chaired by Kofi Annan, with the assistance of a panel of preeminent African leaders.

At the talks the opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), first decamped from its earlier radical position to press for the resignation of President Kibaki to allow for fresh presidential elections, opening the way for the negotiations. The ODM had refused to recognize Kibaki as the president, and during the first few statements from him at the start of the talks, the ODM threw tantrums and almost boycotted the parley after Kibaki referred to himself as the duly elected president of Kenya. The ruling party dodged the reconciliation spirit of the talks and failed to read the intensity of local and international pressure to work on a solution to the impasse. It required the intervention of African Union Chairman and Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who warned the parties of dire consequences if the peace processes were to be derailed. The big stick wielded by the two seemed to have worked, as a new peace accord has now been reached between the warring parties and Kenya will soon have a premier and a president, with both sharing executive powers. The grand coalition agreement will be constitutionalized.

A host of local and international observers in the polls, including the European Union observation team and the Commonwealth, agreed in their reports that the December 2007 elections, particularly the presidential vote tallying, was marred with incompetence and spurious tallying. In a multiethnic society of about 40 distinct ethnic groups, Kenya was firmly jolted by the disputes. At the Annan talks it was also agreed to form a review committee to establish the facts behind the election fiasco, as well as to create a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission to help in reconciling Kenyans and addressing historical grievances that were partly the reasons for the conflicts.

The electoral differences have been very costly for the country: About 1,500 Kenyans died in the post-electoral skirmishes, 350,000 people were displaced from their homes, and many continue to live as internally displaced refugees in temporary camps across the country. Businesses have been stalled, moreover, and by local estimates over US$2 billion losses to businesses have been counted. Any more dithering on the peace talks, and the impatience and war-mongering culture that was beginning to take root in the country would have led Kenya to an eventual paralysis and even collapse. But how did Kenya get to that point in the first place?

Sworn in on a wheelchair after a near-tragic road crash at the height of the 2002 general election campaigns, President Kibaki owed much to his coalition partners for the National Rainbow Coalition euphoria and sense of unity that won him the victory. His last weeks of campaigning found him confined to a wheelchair, but an amalgamated league of campaigners from the coalition’s leading party stalwarts—then known as the Summit—crisscrossed the country on a platform of change.

With the Kenya African National Union’s trouble-free concession of defeat, Kenya’s had been an exemplary political transition in Africa. But that was then. Kibaki faced his reelection against a strong opposition coalition headed by the man who ironically is credited for his presidency, Raila Odinga, and an array of his former ministers.

At his inauguration in 2002, Kibaki and his government promised a new constitution and an end to official corruption, political patronage, and nepotism. It would be these pledges, on the political front, rather than promises of economic revitalization that would dog the Kibaki administration over the coming years. In effect, the Kibaki regime would defend its reelection plan on account of a healthy economy, with a growth rate of 8 percent up from the tottering levels of 2002. However, it had not fulfilled most of the political pledges, particularly those to draw up a new constitution and end high-level corruption. Worse still, the Kibaki administration seemed to have come to revolve around a cabal of ethnic state operators who apparently convinced him to rubbish the preelection Memorandum of Understanding on a power-sharing agreement with his former colleagues.

A Tight Race?

Although a tight election was developing and many pollsters pointed to a close finish, in the minds of many Kenyans it was never to be as contentious and as bloody as it became. Both the Party of National Unity and the ODM attracted huge support across the country. In the end, the Electoral Commission of Kenya released the results of only 209 constituencies (following nullification of the results in 3 constituencies), indicating that the president had won with about 200,000 votes ahead of the ODM presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, and inviting instant dispute. By this time, live broadcasting of the vote tallying process by the media had been banned, and Nairobi was reduced to a police state with heightened security patrols and closures of certain roads. What, then, led to the vicious post-electoral violence in the country?

According to the prediction of former president Moi, multipartyism was bound to bring about tribal tensions and deepen regional divisions in the country. The former president was himself an expert in divide-and-rule tactics of administration. At the height of fervent campaigns for political reforms in Kenya in the 1980s, he opposed political pluralism on the claim that the country was not cohesive enough. Multiparty democracy was finally reintroduced in Kenya in 1991, but early elections in 1992 and 1997 saw poll violence, especially in the Rift Valley parts of western Kenya and the coast of Kenya.

In Kenya’s politics, the capture of safe votes is often strengthened by filial connections between the contestants and electorate. Politicians of the above communities found it expedient to throw out voters from the immigrant settler population so that their declarations of “party zones” would be realized. The Rift Valley was declared a Kenya African National Union zone, and other parties were warned against venturing into the area. Accordingly, this occurrence also fulfilled Moi’s prophecy on political pluralism. In 1997 these conditions were repeated with varying tactics and consequences. Official coverups and impunity often followed state involvement in the clashes. In 1993, though a parliamentary select committee to investigate and make recommendations on the clashes was set up in Kenya, nothing followed. Another Judicial Commission on Tribal Clashes finished its work in 1999, but neither the Moi administration nor the Kibaki administration implemented its recommendations.

Colonial hangover or ethnic complexity?

The divide-and-rule administration tactics, although a legacy of the British colonial administration in Kenya, were polished under the Kenya African National Union regime. State appointments, budgetary allocations, and a distribution of public goodies appear to strictly follow the beacons of ethnic loyalty and closeness to state power. This manner of distributing the national cake is a major cause of the ethnic discontentment and, with the imperial powers of Kenya’s presidency, can be a harbinger for chaos. Figuratively speaking, communities that find themselves at the periphery of power mobilize against the status quo on the basis that it wants the plate to go around. “It is our turn to eat” is an oft-quoted maxim in Kenya’s campaigns.

The communities feeling displaced and marginalized from the center of power by the Kibaki administration bandied together in the ODM against the government. When it lost the opportunity to stage a takeover, therefore, this was going to be painful and frustrating. If it had been through an illegitimate loss in the polls as has been alleged, the violence could only have been expected as a logical consequence of anger and frustration. Deep-seated anger against the Kikuyus, seen to have dominated power and the consumption of the national cake since Kenya’s independence in 1963, can no doubt be blamed for this eventuality. Although the Mau Mau war of independence was related to the Kikuyu uprising against the colonialists for their loss of land, the departing crown bequeathed a shamelessly exploitative and divisive state machinery to the new power elite under Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. With a relatively more educated working class and a better physical infrastructure inherited from the white administrators, Kenyatta capitalized on these advantages to make the Kikuyu a powerful and envied community in the country’s post-independence economic takeoff.

After the declaration of the state of emergency in Kenya in 1952, the British government followed with a land rationalization plan known as the Swynnerton Plan. Under the plan, the British would encourage the newly independent Kenya money to buy back the “White highlands” formerly settled by the colonialists. When the colonial farmers departed, an expansive swathe of land was left uninhabited in a region previously owned by the Kalenjin and Maasai. However, the pastoralist Maasai had in any case lost their claim to a large part of the Rift Valley land through the 1904 and 1911 agreements with the British colonial administration. On the part of the Kalenjins, they witnessed their supposed ancestral land annexed by the independent government and dished out to mainly Kikuyu settlers after independence. This Kikuyu resettlement plan was backed only by a section of the Kalenjin politicians. By 1971, over half of all arable land in the Northern Rift Valley, settled by Kalenjins, were in the hands of new Kikuyu buyers. Without any solution to this historical grievance, Kalenjin-Kikuyu clashes in these areas are bound to recur.

Like the celebrated Mau Mau episode in Kikuyu nationalism, the Kalenjins treasure their brave history too. The community of the Kalenjins was at the forefront in opposing colonialism. When the East African Railway line reached the region, it sparked off the Nandi resistance led by the legendary Orkoiyot Koitalel Arap Samoei from 1905 to 1911. This nationalism has stayed alive in the whole Kalenjin community and political tradition.

But the media culture cannot escape censure. Although the country has a fairly credible independent and free press, Kenya’s media took sides, perceivably to serve ethnic interests in the campaigns. Camouflages of such ethnic interests abet serious frustrations and can spread hate propaganda and falsehoods or become a war-mongering tool. Kenya’s ethnic media stations remained culpable for stroking negative ethnic emotions throughout this period.

It is now important that durable solutions are found to avert a repetition of similar scenes in Kenya’s future. The suggestion to deal with matters of transitional justice, encapsulated in the need for a justice, truth, and reconciliation organ, is still necessary and urgent. This will help to understand and prescribe solutions to Kenya’s enduring pains and grievances. In the near future, emphasis on the return to lasting peace is important, but to seriously address it, constitutional and legislative agreements for power sharing and other solutions to mass poverty are imperative. Finally, for justice to prevail, Kenya’s legislative institutions must attend to the inadequacies in the law instruments and the judicial institutions that adjudicate them. What makes public leaders hesitate to use legal channels to address grievances will only set the stage for bigger chaos.