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Report on the University of Nairobi Peace Forum

April 10, 2017
By 19670

Xena Cupido, a 2012 Sylff fellow from the University of the Western Cape, reports and reflects on the University of Nairobi Peace Forum held on December 8–9, 2016, which she was invited to attend.

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Socrates Majune

Socrates Majune

Violent extremism and the radicalization of youth are phenomena that have captured the attention of the world. To deliberate on issues relating to violent extremism and youth radicalization, a peace forum was initiated by Socrates Majune (2013–15 Sylff fellow) and conducted with the help of an organizing committee consisting of Dr. Jacinta Mwende (2004–06 Sylff fellow), Alexian Marucha, and Steve Muthusi. The committee received the support of the University of Nairobi’s Board of Postgraduate Studies, represented by Gachunga Joseph Kamau. The purpose of the forum was to provide high-level insights and solutions to violent extremism, drawing on the perspectives of various countries. The forum took place at the University of Nairobi on December 8 and 9, 2016. Sylff fellows from various countries in Africa were invited to participate in the peace forum. “If there is one thing I know for sure, it is that I know nothing for sure.” This article reflects on the learning that took place at the peace forum.

Background

It is clear that no country is immune from the effects of violent extremism and youth radicalization. The global phenomenon has no doubt affected a vast number of countries, Kenya being one of the countries most impacted by violent extremism in its recent past. At the start of the peace forum Professor Henry Mutoro, Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Nairobi, delivered an emotional tribute in honor of the 140 students who lost their lives at Garissa University.

Professor Henry Mutoro, Deputy Vice Chancellor, University of Nairobi

Professor Henry Mutoro, Deputy Vice Chancellor, University of Nairobi

The opening address by Professor Mutoro detailed the University of Nairobi’s involvement in the post-extremism events at Garissa University. The story of the tragedy and the University of Nairobi’s gracious response in dealing with bereaved parents, visitors, sponsors, and bereaved students sketched a vivid picture of the destruction and mayhem that occurred. The deputy vice chancellor highlighted that many people do not treat seriously the issue of youth extremism. The University of Nairobi dealt with parents in an ethical and responsible manner and has since been recognized as a Center of Excellence.

It was the events at Garissa that partly contributed to the peace forum initiative—hosting a conference that would make a difference in the county. The organizers noted that East Africa has witnessed a surge of violent extremism, characterized by an increased incidence of acts of terrorism, organized crime, trans-border crime, illicit trade, and trafficking (USAID, 2012). At the center of extremist activities are youth who have been recruited to perpetrate these crimes. The objective of the peace forum was to discuss the causes of violent extremism among young people and to propose nonviolent measures to overcome this trend.

Push-and-Pull Factors in Youth Violence and Extremism

The young generation represents hope. However, young people are increasingly turning to violent extremism due to social and economic factors. It should be noted that the choice to support violent extremism is driven by multiple factors. To understand and explore the reasons behind the sense of disengagement and marginalization that makes young people vulnerable to recruitment, we need to view it from a country perspective. It has become clear that young people join violent extremist groups for a variety of reasons, making generalization problematic. The peace forum provided the opportunity for scholars from various countries to reflect on the importance of networking and harness their knowledge, skills, and competencies to bring about solutions to violent extremism. It also served as a platform to gain new insights.

Dr. Patrick Maluki, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University Nairobi

Dr. Patrick Maluki, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University Nairobi

Dr. Patrick Maluki of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies at the University Nairobi gave a presentation titled “Understanding the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors underlying violent extremism and radicalization among the youth in East Africa,” in which he reflected on the political and economic perspectives of radicalization. He started by focusing on who a radicalized person is, a controversial and emotional topic. Maluki suggested that “radicalized” indicates a kind of passivity, whereby the subjects are presented as victims. The driving forces are normally seen as external. The radicalized are often presented as being alienated from choice, tricked, swayed, lost, or stolen. They are objects of pity and fear, which shifts the focus of attention from the personal or political motivations of radical actors to the methods and processes of conversion or seduction through radicalization.

Radicalization, never clearly defined according to Maluki, implies the violation of essentially passive individuals who are influenced by outside forces; it is an ordered, planned, and structured assault on those individuals. Underpinned by subjective and objective motivations, the phenomenon may be defined by exploring the common notions thereof. It is a process wherein people move away from dialogue and resort to confrontational tactics, such as violent acts of terror. Violence is often used to induce change, which is a fundamental belief of radical extremism.

Dr. Maluki presented a checklist for the radicalization of individuals. He identified five paths to radicalization, all of which are easy for radical groups to exploit: 1) young people from conservative societies and a closed, religious awakening, 2) feelings of marginalization and alienation, 3) grievances, 4) indignation, and 5) a sense of adventure.

Social contact and social networks play integral roles in extremist networks. Close friends and family have been known to be a powerful influencing factor. Radicalization, Dr. Maluki suggests, is an individual or collective social process by which people are brought to condone, legitimize, support, or carry out violence for political or religious objectives. Social bonds and group dynamics, as well as deeply held convictions or perceptions of unfair and unjust international systems, are recognized as strong drivers of radicalization.

Professor Kaimwa Maneno Bruno, Institut National du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics

Professor Kaimwa Maneno Bruno, Institut National du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics

Professor Kaimwa Maneno Bruno of the Institut National du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics reflected on the Democratic Republic of Congo’s experience of violence and radicalization. He highlighted the push-and-pull factors as follows:
• More perpetrators of crime and violence are implicated in armed groups. The complexity and context of the conflict offer opportunities of linkages to criminals and organizations, e.g., local armed groups and trans-border armed groups.
• Child soldier phenomenon (pull factor)
• Governance of natural resources, arms trafficking, and poverty (push factors)

The forum discussed ways to overcome the problem of children being used in armed forces. Children who are left destitute are “given ammunition and told this is your mother and father.” Participants of the forum agreed that these children need to be exposed to peace programs instead of violence programs. We need to build a sense of community and a supportive environment in which to care for children. The participants shared information about projects that they were involved in that target violent extremism: programs leading to the empowerment of youth through workshops and forums that allow for dialogue to take place. There are challenges, often related to stakeholder engagement, partnerships, and funding. Nonetheless, the passion and dedication helps to address some of these challenges.

Starting Meaningful Conversations in the Media

On day two a media representative, Debarl Inea, addressed the forum. According to Inea, who hosts a morning TV news show, there are no conversations happening about radicalization or violent extremism despite all the acts of violent extremism. The media remains reactive toward such events, and no continued conversation is occurring around these events. He reiterated that there were systemic failures in seeing to the needs of young people and urged the forum to start conversations that would guide individuals who work in the area of radicalization and youth extremism, which is one of his own objectives.

Forum participants

Forum participants

Inea shared the story of Mohammed Imwasi, a former IT student who came to be known as “Jihadi John.” Why did ISIL select him? Inea also shared stories of other young people who were radicalized, whose profiles suggested that they came from “well-to-do” families. This implies that the selection of young people stemmed from a strategic intent to recruit from the West, and it may further suggest that ISIL has the ability to infiltrate areas least expected using highly educated young people to spread radical ideologies over all kinds of media. Inea played a video in which Jihadi John spoke about his ideology and why they were taking the lives of the victims.

A discussion ensued around the meaning of jihad and the misconceptions around its meaning. The debate centered on the distortion of religion to serve a particular purpose. Religion is used to spread a particular narrative, but there are no counter-narratives to challenge the current narratives. Mainstream media is being used to spread the narratives as news. Hassan Kinyua Omar, a lecturer in Religious Studies at the University of Nairobi, stated that violent extremism remains a global threat. As long as there is low political participation, feelings of detachment and misrepresentation, and governments that continue to ignore diversity, this threat will persist. He further warned that unchecked corruption can be referred to as a radicalizer.

Final Reflections

The peace forum, organized by the University Nairobi chapter with the support of Sylff Leadership Initiatives, provided the perfect opportunity for a meaningful conversation on the push-and-pull factors underlying violent extremism and the radicalization of youth in East Africa. Forum participants agreed that violent extremism needs to be countered intellectually. Acts of violence and terrorism stem from historical injustices. The question remains: Is the world being taken captive because of a lack of intellectual capacity?

At the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism held in 2015, it was suggested that military force is often the response to extremist violence. But this approach only seems to heighten tensions and trigger more support for violent ideologies; it fails to deal with the factors driving participation in violent extremism. This approach often adds to feelings of exclusion and fails to engage youth as key partners in building resilience against violent extremism.

To move beyond dealing with the symptoms of the problem, young people must be regarded as part of the solution. As young people around the world are working to build peace and prevent violent extremism, more than ever before, the response to violent extremism needs meaningful youth participation at all levels. Working collaboratively with young people to promote peace and to effectively address the drivers of violent extremism requires youth engagement as partners in the design and implementation of relevant programs and policies. Hopefully, by applying our intellectual capacity in this way, we can we start to deal with the challenge of violent extremism.

Group photo with all attendees

References

United States Agency for International Development. Conflict Assessment Framework, 2012, available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf

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Supporting Two Families: Remittance-Sending and the Integration of Immigrants in the United States

March 14, 2017
By 19606

David D. Sussman, a 2003 Sylff fellow of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, reengages the findings from his master’s thesis, which analyzed how remittance-sending affected the integration (self-sufficiency) of immigrants in Boston, and interprets them given the current political environment in the United States. This article was written in early January 2017.

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Introduction

Boston

During the recent presidential election in the United States, the topic of immigration was once again brought to the forefront of political discussions. One candidate, Donald Trump—now president-elect—called for building an impregnable wall on the country’s southern border, limitations on refugee admissions, the deportation of millions of immigrants, and a registry of all Muslims. Putting aside debates over the sensibility (not to mention the legality) of these propositions, we might focus on the lives of refugees and immigrants who already reside in the United States and thereby test the critique that they are not integrating into society quickly enough.

Do we fully appreciate the difficult financial situation of immigrants in the United States? How might our perspectives shift if we better understand the double bind that some of them face, to improve their local situation while also caring for family members overseas? Despite ideological differences between liberals and conservatives on the positives and negatives of migration, each side can agree in hoping that new arrivals improve professionally and educationally. Notwithstanding the passage of time, the research presented here, from my Sylff-supported master’s degree, remains relevant. This article provides relevant background explanation, an overview of my approach, and a summary of findings and briefly reflects on the implications, given present-day political and economic circumstances.

An investigation of this topic was inspired by previous work as a resettlement case manager with the International Rescue Committee in Boston. During my time working with refugees from Africa and Latin America, I was moved by their ongoing struggles. Beyond needing to learn about a new city and culture, and often burdened by traumatic past experiences, US government protocol required them to quickly find any possible job, often at the minimum wage. They worked long hours in such positions as grocery baggers, hotel bellhops, or, if fortunate, as nursing assistants. Their expenses for rent, food, and other basic necessities stretched them to their limits, as Boston was and remains to this day one of the most expensive places to live in the United States. At the same time, nearly all of the refugees sent weekly or monthly remittances to loved ones they had left behind. Often, they received phone calls at all hours of the day and night, from friends and family pleading for further support. The financial challenges faced by these resilient and hard-working refugees was readily apparent, and I knew that, if given the chance one day, I wanted to further study and better understand their circumstances.

Background

For millions of persons who cross borders to seek a new and better life, the memories of and commitment to friends and family back home lead them to maintain connections with their place of origin. In many situations, remittances (financial resources that migrants wire back to their country) serve as the primary purpose of migration, while for those coming from conflict-affected countries, it is primarily safety and freedom that they seek, with remittances as a significant secondary objective. My research examined the potential impact of sending money on immigrants’ integration, as measured through financial and educational “self-sufficiency.”

Immigration remains part and parcel of the United States. As a nation founded by immigrants (at the expense of indigenous populations), new waves of arrivals to the United States over the past two centuries led to continual processes of adjustment and varied degrees of inclusion in the country’s social and economic fabric. As of 2010, more than one in eight persons in the country had been born abroad.1 The foreign-born population remains quite diverse today (53.6% from Latin America, 28.2% from Asia, 12.1% from Europe, and 6.5% from elsewhere),2 though among new entrants, Asians now outnumber Latin Americans.3 The historic role of Massachusetts and the Greater Boston region as host to immigrant populations continues to the present day. The state’s number of immigrants nearly doubled to 1,046,155 between 1990 and 2013,4,5 such that it now has the eighth highest percentage of foreign-born residents, rising from 9.5% in 1990 to 15.6% in 2013.6 In the state’s urban areas, such as Boston (Suffolk County), 27.4% of persons were foreign born as of 2013.7

Globally, remittance amounts have risen dramatically over recent decades—from less than $2 billion in 1970 to $70 billion in 1995,8 and despite a brief slowdown during the global financial crisis, to more than $430 billion in 2015.9 Sending remittances is a high priority among the financial decisions that immigrants face. The 2003 National Survey of Latinos in the United States found that many respondents remitted before taking care of their bills, others paid for their household expenses first, and only a few did not consider sending funds to be important.10 According to one Mexican interviewed, “Before anything, I send them the money because they count on it. Then afterwards I pay my bills, my rent, but the first thing I do is send it.”11

Economic self-sufficiency is often defined simply, as when immigrants’ wages attain levels similar to those of native populations.12 In reality, it can also be measured in various other ways, particularly education and social achievement. For example, the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development’s assessment form to determine self-sufficiency demonstrates the complexity of factors influencing the measure; areas of focus include employment, education, health, childcare, family development, housing, income management, transportation, resident participation, and nutrition.13

Methodology

Centro Presente

Centro Presente

For my research I focused on studying Somali refugees and Salvadoran economic migrants (among a broader range of Latin Americans) living in Boston due to their significance as immigrant groups and, with preliminary evidence showing that they remitted at high levels, the potential for differential findings between them. To connect with potential respondents, I volunteered in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes at two community organizations supporting immigrants, Centro Presente and the Somali Development Center. In this way, it was possible to meet clients who felt comfortable agreeing to qualitative interviews (16 Somalis and 19 Central Americans, 6 of them Salvadoran). Notably, those who visited the agencies were probably both a) poorer and more in need of support than more wealthy families and yet b) better connected and more successful than other persons in that community who did not have knowledge of or the ability to attend a social service agency.

Somali Development Center

Somali Development Center

The thesis research was unique because it 1) conducted extensive one-on-one interviews, using qualitative as opposed to quantitative analysis, 2) focused on the economic and educational self-sufficiency of the immigrants, which was a narrower approach than the multiple factors that other authors had investigated, and 3) considered the impact of remittance sending by both refugees and economic migrants.

Findings

Overall, the study found that sending remittances could be correlated with a difference in the self-sufficiency of migrants. In short, sending money abroad reduced immigrants’ available resources for advancing their careers and pursuing education, thereby making them less likely to become self-sufficient. In a number of cases, interviewees directly noted that they saw how their lives were impacted by remitting, potentially reducing opportunities.

The interaction between individual household characteristics and remitting is depicted in the figure I created below, which I refer to as the “Remittance/Self-Sufficiency Cycle.” A combination of financial, educational, and social factors lead to the attainment of household self-sufficiency and influence the amount of money that immigrants have available to remit if they wish to do so (see no. 1 in the figure). The sending of money to friends and family overseas can affect the ability of a family to achieve self-sufficiency; the monies that would have otherwise been invested in such areas as education, housing, and job skills are instead remitted (see no. 2).

Interestingly, there also appeared to be an important distinction in the approach to self-sufficiency. While Somali refugees hoped to get jobs and thought about the long-term, a significant number of the Central Americans wanted to remain in the United States long enough to earn money and then return to their country of origin. The Latin Americans pursued education to improve their job prospects but seemed less focused on aspects of permanent relocation. It is possible that differences in the economic situation of the two groups existed because, as refugees, Somalis qualified for a period of government assistance, whereas many Latinos (particularly those who entered illegally), as economic migrants, did not.

As such, the impact of remittances can be studied at two points: at “basic self-sufficiency” and at “long-term self-sufficiency.” The majority of the immigrants interviewed made sure that they addressed some but not all basic needs before sending remittances. Considering the elements of basic self-sufficiency, food and housing were priorities. Education and language abilities, however, often came second to sending monies overseas. Looking at long-term self-sufficiency, few immigrants were able to consider these needs. For most of them, if not all, the purchase of a house was beyond the realm of possibility, as was buying items like cars and computers. While a number improved their education level and advanced in their employment, they remained at relatively low wages. Nevertheless, when immigrants reflected on their life in the United States, they often made a comparison to their country of origin and so, despite their present difficulties, considered themselves fortunate to be in the United States.

Implications

We live in a mobile world, and the long-term prognosis is that migration pressures will continue. The significance of this study’s findings is that they show how, given economic obligation to family members, migrants are doubly responsible for both their relatives’ livelihood and their own well-being.

In light of the recent transfer of power from a Democratic to a Republican administration, this deeper understanding of immigrants and their self-sufficiency remains particularly important. On the one hand, liberals can look at the struggles of immigrants as evidence that more (e.g., legal protection and social services) is needed to support their successful adjustment to life in the United States. There are challenges, however, and with deepening inequality as a broader societal concern, one question is whether some immigrants, burdened by caring for families across borders, may become trapped as an underclass.

On the other hand, conservatives may point to difficulties in achieving self-sufficiency as evidence of the need to restrict certain types of immigration to the United States. They may believe that when many immigrants have a hard time attaining a middle-class lifestyle, it exemplifies their failure to work hard and succeed in the US economy. This misconception may lead to anti-migrant policies under the Trump administration, but even if there are limitations on immigrant entry, millions of foreign-born residents will still possess a legal right to remain in the United States.

Under these circumstances, what is in citizens’ control—regardless of government policy—is their support and welcoming attitudes toward newcomers, and a steady pressure placed on policymakers. In this way, their individual or collectively organized actions can make a positive difference in the lives of new arrivals, and society at large.


1U.S. Census Bureau. 2012. “The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010,” p. 4.
2Ibid.
3Pew Research Center. 2015. “Asians Projected to Become the Largest Immigrant Group, Surpassing Hispanics,” accessed at: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/modern-immigration-wave-brings-59-million-to-u-s-driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065/ph_2015-09-28_immigration-through-2065-05/.
4Uriarte, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/modern-immigration-wave-brings-59-million-to-u-s-driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065/ph_2015-09-28_immigration-through-2065-05/Miren et al. 2003. “Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans and Colombians: A Scan of Needs of Recent Latin American Immigrants to the Boston Area,” edited draft, May 12, 2003, final report of the 2003 Practicum in Applied Research of the PhD Program in Public Policy at the John W. McCormack School of Policy Studies at the University of Massachusetts Boston, p. 3.
5 American Immigration Council. 2015. “New Americans in Massachusetts: The Political and Economic Power of Immigrants, Latinos, and Asians in the Bay State,” accessed at: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/new-americans-massachusetts.
6 Index Mundi. N.D. “United States—Foreign-Born Population Percentage by State,” accessed at: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/united-states/quick-facts/all-states/foreign-born-population-percent#chart. American Immigration Council. 2015.
7Index Mundi. N.D. “Massachusetts Foreign-Born Population Percentage by County,” accessed at: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/united-states/quick-facts/massachusetts/foreign-born-population-percent#chart.
8Taylor, J. Edward. 2000. “Do Government Programs ‘Crowd In’ Remittances?” Inter-American Dialogue and Tomas Rivera Policy Institute.

9World Bank. 2016. “Remittances to Developing Countries Edge Up Slightly in 2015,” accessed at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/13/remittances-to-developing-countries-edge-up-slightly-in-2015.

10Suro, Roberto et al. 2002. “Billions in Motion: Latino Immigrants, Remittances, and Banking,” Pew Hispanic Center and Multilateral Investment Fund, p. 7.
11Ibid.
12Borjas, George. 1999. “The Economic Analysis of Immigration,” accessed at: http://www.ppge.ufrgs.br/giacomo/arquivos/eco02268/borjas-1999.pdf, p. 22.
13Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development. “Massachusetts Family Self-Sufficiency Scales and Ladders Assessment Form.”

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